University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 81

Issue 1

Article 3

February 2013

Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Performance of
Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions
Brian JM Quinn
Boston College Law, bjmquinn@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brian JM Quinn, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Performance of Earnouts in Corporate
Acquisitions, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2013)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Quinn: Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions

PUTTING YOUR MONEY WHERE YOUR MOUTH IS:
THE PERFORMANCE OF EARNOUTS IN CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS
Brian JM Quinn

This Article seeks to answer the question whether earnouts really serve
to respond to adverse selection, as commonly believed, or if
alternatively, they better address problems created by symmetric
uncertainty. To answer this question, I conduct difference of means
tests for fair value estimates of earnouts at the time of acquisition and
during the post-closing period. To the extent sellers rely on earnouts
during the pre-contractual period to signal unobservable information
about their own quality to an acquirer, then post-closing fair value
estimates should increase as acquirers confirm seller pre-signing
statements. In fact, I do not find significant differences in the fair value
disclosures at the time of acquisition and during the post-closing period,
which suggests that parties rely on earnouts primarily to resolve
problems of uncertainty rather than adverse selection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to answer the question of whether earnouts really
serve to respond to adverse selection, as commonly believed, or if
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alternatively, whether earnouts better address problems created by
uncertainty. To answer this question, I conduct difference of means
tests for fair value estimates of earnouts at the time of acquisition and
during the post-closing period. To the extent sellers rely on earnouts
during the pre-contractual period to signal unobservable information
about the sellers’ own quality to an acquirer, then post-closing fair value
estimates should increase as acquirers confirm seller pre-signing
statements. In fact, I do not find significant differences in the fair value
disclosures at the time of acquisition and during the post-closing period,
which suggests that parties rely on earnouts primarily to resolve the
problem of uncertainty rather than adverse selection.
Previous studies have identified earnout provisions in merger
agreements as possible contractual responses to the problem of adverse
selection in the context of corporate acquisitions.1 According to this
account, sellers have private information about themselves that they are
unable to credibly convey to potential acquirers. In the absence of a
credible information signal, a high-quality seller may be unable to
overcome the buyer’s presumption that there is hidden negative
information about the seller.
A seller’s inability to verifiably
demonstrate value may impede consummation of a potentially valueenhancing transaction. Financial economists suggest that high quality
sellers rely on the earnout as a mechanism for sellers to signal private
information about their quality to potential acquirers.2 By deferring the
ultimate valuation of the target until a point in time after the buyer is
able to confirm the seller’s pre-contractual statements, a high quality
seller may be able to rely on an earnout mechanism to demonstrate her
confidence in the firm’s value.3 Because an earnout provision is costly
to sellers who know they are low quality sellers, those sellers should be
1. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain, David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Earnouts: A Study of
Financial Contracting in Acquisition Agreements, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151 (2011); Ninon Kohers &
James Ang, Earnouts in Mergers: Agreeing to Disagree and Agreeing to Stay, 73 J. BUS. 445 (2000);
Srikant Datar, Richard Frankel & Mark Wolfson, Earnouts: The Effects of Diverse Selection and Agency
Costs on Acquisition Techniques, 17 J. L.ECON. & ORG. 201 (2001); see also ROBERT F. BRUNER,
APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 614 (2004); Roberto Ragozzino & Jeffrey J. Reuer, Contingent
Earnouts in Acquisitions of Privately Held Targets, 20 J. MGMT. 1 (2009). Those of us in the legal
academy who teach “Deals” classes often treat earnouts as contractual responses to asymmetric
information.
2. See generally Cain et al., supra note 1; Datar et al., supra note 1; Kohers & Ang, supra note
1; see also Raggazinno & Reuer, supra note 1. All of these sources endorse the adverse
selection/signaling hypothesis.
3. Victor P. Goldberg, Economic Reasoning and the Framing of Contract Law: Sale of an Asset
of Uncertain Value 11 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 164, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=216649 (making the claim that earnouts are a
contractual response to adverse selection); see also VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 143 (2006) [hereinafter Framing Contract] (making similar claim with respect
to earnouts as contractual responses to adverse selection).
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expected to avoid agreeing to receive contingent payments. Thus, the
earnout provision may permit a high quality seller to “put her money
where her mouth is” and thus credibly convey hidden information about
her quality to prospective buyers.4
A recent example illustrates the point that earnouts can help parties
reach agreement on valuation issues. In April 2011, Sanofi, S.A.
acquired Genzyme Corp.5 During merger negotiations, the parties had a
fundamental disagreement over Genyzme’s valuation. Genzyme had
previously experienced a number of difficulties in the production plants
for its Cerezyme and Fabrazyme products. Genzyme management
believed they resolved these serious production issues. These problems,
however, had a materially negative impact on the valuation of the firm.6
Genzyme’s management also believed that Lemtrada, a drug in the
company’s development pipeline, had the potential to be extremely
profitable for the firm.7 For its part, Sanofi was less sanguine about the
prospects of these products to contribute to the firm’s bottom line or that
Genzyme had overcome its production problems. In order to bridge
these differences, the parties structured the merger consideration in this
transaction in the following manner: the first component consisted of a
cash payment equal to $74 per share payable at closing.8 The second
component was a contingent payment of up to $14 per share payable
after the closing upon Genzyme’s achievement of certain regulatory and
financial milestones.9 The contingent payment in this case helped
4. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 206 (1975). Cf. Datar et al., supra note 1, at
208. Simple assertions by the seller lack credibility in the context of negotiations and may be
interpreted as “cheap talk” unless the seller is able to convey the information credibly. In order to
convey information credibly, the statement must come at some cost to the speaker. R. PRESTON
MCAFEE, COMPETITIVE SOLUTIONS: THE STRATEGIST’S TOOLKIT 376–77 (2002).
5. Genzym Revenues Grow in First-Quarter 2011, GENZYME (Sept. 10, 2012, 7:10 PM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/genzyme/20110427006998/en.
6. Genzyme Shares Fall on FDA Plant Inspection Plans, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 20, 2010,
available at
http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2010/03/25/genzyme_shares_fall_on_fda_plant_ins
pection_plans/.
7. See Timeline: Sanofi’s Quest for U.S. Biotech Genzyme, REUTERS, Feb. 15, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/15/genzyme-sanofi-timeline-idUSN1519571120110215.
8. Albertina Torsoli & Meg Tirrell, Sanofi–Genzyme Deal Worth $20.1 Billion, SFGATE, Feb.
17,
2011,
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Sanofi-Genzyme-deal-worth-20-1-billion2474621.php.
9. Id. The contingent payment took the form of a contingent value right (CVR), a registered
security. The CVR adopted in the Sanofi–Genzyme transaction is a form of earnout that is more
common in the sale of public companies than in the sale of private companies. Genzyme, Questions and
Answers Regarding the CVR (Form 8-K) (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Genzyme Questions], available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732485/000095012311017162/b85162exv99waw43.htm.
Sanofi contracted to make payments to security-holders contingent upon the following milestones:
1. $1/CVR if specified Cerezyme and Fabrazyme production thresholds are met for 2011;
2. $1/CVR upon final FDA approval of Lemtrada;

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3

130

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

resolve the parties’ differences about production problems and revenue
expectations for drugs in the Genzyme pipeline. To the extent the
production issues had been resolved—as Genzyme managers assured the
acquirer they were—Genzyme shareholders would receive additional
value. To the extent the pipeline drugs lived up to the expectations of
Genzyme’s management, that success would be reflected in an increase
in the ex post valuation of the seller as demonstrated by an increase in
the contingent payment obligation. If Genzyme failed to perform to
expectations, Sanofi would not be required to make additional
payments. By deferring the ultimate determination of value until a point
in the future, both the buyer and the seller were able to proceed with the
deal notwithstanding unresolved differences with respect to valuation.10
There are two competing hypotheses to explain the motivation for
parties’ reliance on earnouts in merger agreements.
Financial
economists and legal scholars commonly believe that earnouts are a
contractual response to adverse selection. According to this theory,
earnouts play an important role in eliciting hidden information from
sellers. By deferring the final valuation until a later point in time, sellers
are able to signal their unobservable quality to potential buyers and thus
resolve information asymmetries.
Therefore, when Genzyme’s
managers agreed to defer some portion of the consideration, they may be
signaling private information to Sanofi. According to the competing
hypothesis, earnouts do not play a role in conveying information
between the parties. Rather, earnouts respond to the problem of
uncertainty present in merger transactions. Earnouts resolve uncertainty
by assigning the risk of a negative outcome to the seller and therefore
facilitate the parties in reaching an agreement.
To date, the academic literature on the question of earnout provisions
has focused largely on the adverse selection hypothesis as the best
explanation for the use of earnouts.11 In industries and transactional
3. $2/CVR if global net sales revenue total $400 million;
4. $3/CVR if global net sales revenue total $1.8 billion;
5. $4/CVR if global net sales revenue total $2.3 billion; and
6. $3/CVR if global net sales revenue total $2.8 billion.
10. Earnouts and contingent compensation like the one used in the Sanofi–Genzyme transaction
are relatively common provisions in merger agreements. The 2011 Private Target Deal Points Study
reports that earnout provisions are present in 38% of agreements in their sample of private company
sellers. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2011 PRIVATE TARGET MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL
POINTS STUDY 20 (2012) [hereinafter ABA]; see also Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1 (noting
similarly high levels of contingent payment mechanisms when the seller is a private company). The
2011 M&A Deal Terms Study by Shareholder Representative Services conducted a review of 196
transactions with private company targets. In that survey, 23% of the transactions included a postclosing contingent payment mechanism. SHAREHOLDER REPRESENTATIVE SERVICES, 2011 M&A DEAL
TERMS STUDY 18 (2011).
11. See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 1, at 13; Datar et al. supra note 1; Kohers & Ang, supra note
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situations where divergences in information between buyers and sellers
are expected to be more extreme, buyers and sellers are more likely to
rely on earnout provisions to bridge the valuation gap.12 Empirical
evidence also supports the argument that the structure of earnout terms
is intentionally designed to address the most critical sources of
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers.13 This previous
work generally supports an inference that earnouts exist to signal
unobservable quality in response to adverse selection. Consequently,
the adverse selection hypothesis has become the dominant hypothesis in
thinking about the role of contingent payments in merger agreements.
Until recently, post-closing data related to earnouts has been
extremely limited. What happened to sellers during the post-closing
period was not transparent to outside observers. As a result, the range of
questions that earlier studies could address was relatively narrow. Gaps
in the data meant that although one might be able to predict when parties
are more likely to adopt contingent payment mechanisms in an
acquisition, there was no reliable assessment of whether in fact parties
relied on earnouts to generate credible information signals or in response
to some other problem. Not surprisingly, many gaps remain in our
understanding of the role of earnout provisions in resolving the problem
of adverse selection in contracting.
This Article uses newly available “fair value” accounting data to help
answer the question of whether sellers use contingent payment
mechanisms in merger transactions to signal private information about
their hidden value to potential buyers.14 New fair value accounting rules
require acquirers to make disclosures about the expected value of
contingent payments related to merger transactions.15 This new
visibility into the post-closing period permits outside observers to test
the power of earnouts to overcome information asymmetries and to
make some inferences about the role contingent payments play in
potentially resolving adverse selection problems. I conduct difference
of means tests on the fair value data to determine whether acquirers
report learning new positive information about sellers during the postclosing period and whether sellers appear to rely on earnouts to signal
hidden information to acquirers. A significant conclusion from the fair
value data, one that contradicts previous findings, is that earnouts do not
appear to function as credible information signals for high quality sellers
1; see also Raggazinno & Reuer, supra note 1, at 3.
12. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 216–20.
13. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 32.
14. See generally FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 141 (2007) [hereinafter SFAS 141R].
15. Id. at 67–73.
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who might rely on them to overcome adverse selection.
According to acquirer disclosures, during the first eight quarters
following the announcement of the transaction, the average fair value of
contingent payments reported by acquirers declined from 70% of the
nominal value of the earnout to just under 55% of the nominal value.
Similar declines are present across a variety of industrial sectors and
contracting scenarios. If sellers were relying on earnouts to signal
private information, we would expect to see acquirers systematically
confirm these statements during the post-closing period, thus providing
a self-enforcing separating equilibrium between high and low quality
sellers. The fair value data observed here suggests acquirers are not
learning new information that might confirm pre-signing seller
statements during the post-closing period. If earnouts do not permit
high quality sellers to sort themselves from low quality sellers, earnouts
lose one of the most important functions attributed to them by previous
studies.
The new fair value data provides support for the competing
uncertainty hypothesis. Where buyers and sellers may have different
estimates for the probabilities of future events or states of the world due
to uncertainty, these differences can generate transaction costs between
the buyer and sellers. The existence of such transaction costs in the
merger agreement may violate the basic assumptions of efficient pricing
theory and thus be an obstacle to successful contracting.16 Where
symmetrical uncertainty rather than asymmetric information is the
concern, the earnout may be an example of a contractual device that
lawyers use to reduce transaction costs associated with uncertainty and
create value for their clients.17 By reducing symmetrical uncertainty
faced by parties in a transaction and assigning the probability of a
negative outcome to sellers, earnouts can improve pricing efficiency.18

16. Gilson observed that the acquisition of a corporation is nothing more than the acquisition of a
capital asset. If that is true, then an efficient price for such an asset could be obtained through the
application of an asset pricing model. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 241–47 (1984).
17. In his well-known article on value creation by lawyers, Professor Gilson studied the earnouts
as a contractual device that can be used to create value:
My hypothesis about what business lawyers really do-their potential to create value-is
simply this: Lawyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient
mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory’s hypothetical
world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this
world. Value is created when the transactional structure designed by the business lawyer
allows the parties to act, for that transaction, as if the assumptions on which capital asset
pricing theory is based were accurate.
Id. at 255.
18. Professor Gilson argued that earnouts assist parties in reaching efficient prices by resolving
the problem of uncertainty in transactions. Id. at 263–64.
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The earnout may thus help facilitate contracting while not necessarily
generating new information or resolving any adverse selection problem.
To the extent the new fair value data does not support the adverse
selection hypothesis, these results also inform the nascent study of
transactional law, which posits that earnouts play an important role in
generating pre-contractual information.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the earnout
mechanism as it is commonly used in merger agreements. Part III
provides a brief overview of the competing hypotheses, adverse
selection and uncertainty, to explain the reliance of parties on earnouts
in merger agreements. Part IV examines the contributions of financial
economists who have examined the prevalence of earnouts and the
structure of consideration in merger agreements. In general, these
previous studies have largely supported the proposition that earnouts are
a contractual response to adverse selection in the deal making process.
Part V provides an assessment of the fair value data for contingent
payments using difference of means tests. Part VI draws general
conclusions from the fair value data. In particular, the fair value data
does not support the claim that earnouts are contractual responses to the
problem of adverse selection. The competing uncertainty hypothesis is
a more likely explanation for parties’ reliance on the earnout provision.
Finally, Part VII poses some remaining questions and alternative
interpretations.
II. THE EARNOUT MECHANISM
An earnout provision is a contractual provision in a merger agreement
that creates a contingent payment obligation for the acquirer. The
contingency is payable upon the seller achieving certain targets,
financial or nonfinancial, during the post-closing period. From the point
of view of the buyer and seller, the goal of the earnout is to overcome
significant valuation differences that may come between the parties
during negotiations and prevent them from reaching agreement.19
Through a contingent payment structure, the parties agree to disagree
and defer the ultimate valuation question until a later point in time when
the uncertainties with respect to valuation have been resolved.20 The
earnout falls into a broader category of post-closing pricing adjustments
that includes other devices like contingent value rights, escrows,
indemnity funds, working capital adjustments, and bonus plans, among
19. See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 1, at 613–17 (observing that differences with respect to
expectations of future performance is a source of disagreements during acquisition negotiations);
Framing Contract, supra note 3; Gilson, supra note 16, at 241–43.
20. See generally Gilson, supra note 6, at 263–65; FREUND, supra note 4, at 203–23.
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others.21 All these provisions alter the structure of consideration in the
merger transaction to create some opportunity for an ex post settling
up.22 The opportunity for an ex post settling up is a central feature of
the earnout provision.
Corporate acquisitions are highly complex transactions that often
involve large amounts of private information. This private information
may relate to the future prospects of the seller or status of the seller’s
product that may be known only to the seller. Although buyers engage
in significant due diligence, it may be impossible, without great effort,
for a buyer to uncover all of the private information that a seller may
possess. To the extent the seller’s private information is negative, a
seller may have an incentive to shade it or downplay its importance.
Sellers may also find it difficult to convey positive information to the
buyer in a way that is credible.23 In addition to information problems,
there may also be fundamental disagreements about the future of the
seller or the seller’s industry that can negatively impact the acquirer’s
valuation of the seller.24 These fundamental disagreements often reflect
the high degree of uncertainty that is present in a complex merger
transaction. Consequently, buyers and sellers may find themselves
unable to agree on an appropriate valuation for the seller. By providing
parties with an ex post opportunity to settle up, the earnout provision
helps fill the valuation gap between buyers and sellers generated either
by information asymmetries or uncertainty. In effect, the parties rely on
the contingent payment mechanism to come to a final determination of
the sellers during the post-closing period after the acquirer has had an
opportunity to learn the seller’s private information or after uncertainties
affecting valuation have been resolved.
The content of earnout provisions are extremely heterogeneous and
21. BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610; E. THOM RUMBERGER, JR. ET AL., THE ACQUISITION AND
SALE OF EMERGING GROWTH COMPANY: THE M&A EXIT § 5 (2009); Leigh Walton & Kevin D. Kreb,
Purchase Price Adjustments, Earnouts, and Other Purchase Price Provisions (Dec. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
22. Escrows and indemnity funds provide for clawbacks in the event it turns out at some point
following closing that the seller’s representations and warranties were not true when made. In their
traditional CVRs use provide for additional post-closing payments to the seller in the event the
acquirer’s stock—its acquisition currency—is not as valuable post-closing as had been anticipated at the
time of the transaction. RUMBERGER, supra note 21, § 9. The CVR as described here differs from the
CVR described in the Genzyme/Sanofi transaction. The Genzyme/Sanofi CVR is better described as a
tradable earnout security.
23. Mere statements by the seller revealing positive private information about the seller, without
more, may be misinterpreted by the potential buyer as being no more than “cheap talk” and therefore not
a credible source of information about the seller. See Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk Can
Matter in Bargaining, 48 J. ECON. THEORY 221 (1989) (arguing however that although talk without the
consequences of potential sanction is expected to be uninformative, under some circumstances, cheap
talk can be useful in bargaining).
24. See generally Gilson, supra note 16; FREUND, supra note 4.
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context dependent. However, earnout provisions have certain common
features that can be found in all such provisions. First, earnout
provisions tie the payment of additional merger consideration to the
seller’s accomplishment of certain specified targets or milestones during
the post-closing period.25 Earnout targets are often proxies for seller or
seller product performance and fall into one of two general categories:
financial or nonfinancial targets.26 Financial targets may include some
measure of top-line revenues, cash flow, EBITDA, profitability, or other
costs that can be directly tied back to the financial performance of the
seller.27 Nonfinancial targets may include some nonfinancial proxy for
revenue—for example, unit sales or licenses.
Alternatively,
nonfinancial targets may include market share targets, or specific
customer-oriented goals. Nonfinancial targets may also include certain
technological achievements or regulatory approvals, such as FDA
approval for medical devices and pharmaceutical products.28
Second, parties may negotiate triggers for contingent payments in a
number of forms: sliding scale, cliffs, or binary. Binary triggers are
common and relatively easy to administer. Binary triggers authorize
payment of the earnout only upon the meeting of the stated milestone.
Nonfinancial targets, like regulatory approval, are amenable to binary
payment milestones. A product either receives regulatory approval and
is therefore valuable to the acquirer or it does not and is therefore less
valuable. For example, one of the payment triggers in the Genzyme
earnout was related to the government approval for a new drug in the
Genzyme pipeline.29 The uncertainty about the prospect of receiving
government approval had a material effect on the acquirer’s valuation of
the seller. The source of that uncertainty may have been endogenous—
the seller had information about the likelihood of receiving government
approval that it was unable to credibly convey to the acquirer—or it may
have been exogenous, a result of symmetrical uncertainty.
Though binary milestones are appropriate in some circumstances,
they may not be appropriate all the time. Binary milestones may
sometimes run afoul of other incentive issues. For example, if it
becomes apparent to the seller that she will not be able to achieve the
milestone, the seller may have little incentive to exert any efforts to
meet the goal. In response to this potential problem, drafters sometimes
rely on incremental milestones or sliding scale payments. Incremental
25.
26.
27.
(2005).
28.
29.

RUMBERGER, supra note 21, § 5:60–74.
See id.; Walton & Kreb, supra note 21; BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610.
ABA, THE M&A PROCESS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 147–48
See generally Walton & Kreb, supra note 21; BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610–11.
Genzyme Questions, supra note 9.
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milestones recognize that there may be negative incentive effects
associated with a “cliff.”30 The Genzyme contingent payment also
included a series of incremental milestones tied to various levels of
revenues achieved by the seller.31 Sliding scale triggers are a further
variation on the incremental milestones. Sliding scale payments do
away with the potentially negative incentive effects of a cliff by acting
like royalties, payable as a percentage of revenue, or profits or some
other continuous variable that the parties have identified. Of course, the
downside of such an approach is that it rewards satisficing behavior by
sellers rather than incentivizing maximization of the threshold targets by
sellers.
Third, the length of earnouts typically varies anywhere between one
and five years. In general, the term of the earnout provision should be
long enough to resolve the uncertainty that caused the fundamental
disagreement over valuation.32 Fourth, the size of an earnout relative to
the total consideration in the transaction also varies. In general, the size
typically reflects the degree of uncertainty between the parties with
respect to the seller’s value.33 To the extent the duration and the size of
the earnout are long and large enough to overcome the uncertainty that
gives rise to the valuation differences between the parties, the earnout
mechanism is an appropriate device to address valuation disagreements.
In addition to questions of size and duration of the earnout, the degree
of autonomy and control over the seller’s business during the postclosing period is often central to the negotiation of the provision.
Control and autonomy are important because the likelihood that the
seller’s shareholders will receive any contingent payments is tied to the
ability of continuing employees to take actions that will maximize the
seller’s value with respect to the earnout targets.34 To the extent selling
shareholders will not continue their involvement with the seller postclosing and to the degree buyers do not to keep the seller apart from the
parent, buyers may face incentives to undermine the implementation of
the earnout in an effort to reduce their payment obligations under the
earnout provision—a moral hazard.
III. COMPETING HYPOTHESES: ADVERSE SELECTION AND UNCERTAINTY
Practitioners often refer to the “valuation gap” that comes between
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See generally Walton & Kreb, supra note 21.
Genzyme Corp., Contingent Value Right Agreement (Exhibit to Form 8-K) (Mar. 6, 2010).
See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 151; Gilson, supra note 16, at 268–69.
See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 151–53; Gilson, supra note 16, at 267–69.
See generally Walton & Kreb, supra note 21; BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610–13;
RUMBERGER, supra note 21, § 5:60–65.
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buyers and sellers during merger negotiations.35 The valuation gap
refers to the pricing difference between what the seller believes itself to
be worth and what the buyer is willing to pay. The earnout is a
contractual response to this valuation gap and helps parties bridge their
differences. There are two competing hypotheses to explain why the
earnout mechanism is able to resolve the differences between parties.
The dominant hypothesis is advanced by financial economists and legal
scholars who believe the earnout is a contractual response to adverse
selection.
According to this view, by resolving information
asymmetries, the earnout helps parties overcome contracting challenges
that might otherwise inhibit parties coming to agreement. The second
hypothesis is advanced by practitioners and legal scholars who believe
the earnout mechanism resolves the problem of pre-contractual
uncertainty rather than adverse selection. In this view, symmetrical
uncertainty, rather than adverse selection, is the cause of the contracting
challenge. By creating uniform expectations about future events, parties
are able assign the costs of adverse outcomes to the party best able to
accept them and proceed to agreement.
Professor George Akerlof analyzed the problem of adverse selection
in his well-known paper on the “lemons market.”36 A lemons market
arises when, prior to contracting, it is expensive or otherwise difficult
for acquirers to accurately distinguish between high quality and low
quality sellers.37 Because buyers are unable to distinguish between
sellers, they offer only the average price for a pool including both high
and low quality types. If left unresolved, high quality sellers exit the
market, leaving only low quality sellers, and the lemons market
collapses. Professor Akerlof illustrated this problem by proposing a
thought experiment with a used car market where the sellers had
information about the quality of the car they had available for sale that
was unavailable to potential buyers.38 Potential acquirers knew only
that the pool of used cars available for sale included both low quality
and high quality cars. Consequently, potential acquirers price their
offers equal to the expected value of a pool of sellers that includes both
low and high quality sellers. High quality sellers know their own
valuations and withhold their cars from the market, leaving only low
quality cars, or lemons, in the market.39 In a market where high quality
sellers are unable to distinguish themselves from low quality sellers, this
35. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 4, at 214–17.
36. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
37. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 48 (6th ed. 2012).
38. Akerlof, supra note 36, at 489–92.
39. See id. at 489–97.
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information asymmetry can mean that otherwise socially valuable
transactions do not go forward.
Sellers understand this problem and can engage in signaling behavior
to overcome adverse selection.40 In order for signals to help buyers and
sellers overcome the problem of adverse selection, the seller must be
able to convey information about its unobservable quality to the buyer.
The distinguishing feature of a credible signal is the cost to low quality
types who make the statement. This cost feature creates separation in
the marketplace between high and low quality types.41 Because signals
are costly to low quality sellers, sellers who know they are a low quality
type have incentives to avoid making such statements.42 High quality
sellers, on the other hand, are willing and able to make relatively costly
contingent statements because they know they will not likely have to
incur the costs associated with incorrect statements. The relative cost
differences faced by high and low quality sellers leads to a selfseparation in the market as high quality sellers reveal themselves to
buyers in a way that buyers can believe.43 In the context of Akerlof’s
used cars, a seller might offer a warranty on the quality of the car as an
example of a costly signal to demonstrate the seller’s confidence in its
unobservable quality.44 A warranty would be costly to the seller if the
seller had hidden information about the quality of the seller’s car that
indicated it was a low quality type. Therefore, low quality sellers are
less likely to offer warranties and stand by their cars during the postclosing period than would a high quality seller. This commitment to a
post-closing warranty obligation separates the market into high and low
quality sellers in a way that buyers can easily observe.
In the merger context, costly contingent commitments by sellers may
play a role similar to that of warranties in Akerlof’s lemons market.
Deferring payments until post-closing may permit drafters to more
closely align the valuation question with the sources of potential
information asymmetries. By deferring the valuation decision until
40. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 329
(2007); see also Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973) (modeling the hiring
decision as one where there is asymmetric information with respect to the unobservable quality of
applicants, with applicants investing in education in order to signal their quality to potential employers).
41. RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 329; IAN MOLHO, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: LYING
AND CHEATING IN MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONS 63 (1997).
42. Cf. RASMUSEN, supra note 40; Spence, supra note 40.
43. Cf. RASMUSEN, supra note 40; Spence, supra note 40.
44. Akerlof also suggested a number of other institutional responses to overcoming adverse
selection, including branding, licensing, and franchises. See Akerlof, supra note 36, at 499–500. In the
insurance industry, which is an industry often beset by adverse selection problems, insurance companies
rely on copayments and deductibles to help resolve the problem of adverse selection. COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 37, at 49. Molho observes that advertising is a form of signaling behavior that high quality
sellers can use to demonstrate unobservable quality. MOLHO, supra note 41 at 95.
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post-closing, sellers can create credible information signals and thereby
help resolve potential adverse selection problems.45 On the other hand,
sellers who have hidden information about their quality that suggests the
seller is a low quality seller will avoid accepting contingent
consideration, as such a structure is costly to the seller. Sellers with
hidden information that suggests the seller is a high quality seller may
be more likely to agree to accept contingent payments because they are
more confident that they will receive the payments during the postclosing period when the uncertainty is resolved in their favor. By
helping high quality sellers convey hidden information about the
unobservable quality of the seller to potential buyers, the earnout can
help separate the high quality sellers from the low quality sellers. Thus,
the earnout may help resolve the problem of adverse selection.46
An alternative view on the utility of earnouts is that buyers and sellers
rely on them to resolve the problem of uncertainty.47 Uncertainty about
future events can adversely affect the ability of buyers and sellers to
reach agreement on valuation of an asset. Professor Frank Knight
distinguished between “risk” and “uncertainty.”48 The first represents
an unknown but calculable outcome, while the second represents an
outcome whose ex ante probabilities are essentially unknowable.49 To
the extent negative outcomes are tied to asymmetric information,
including adverse selection, the ex ante probabilities of negative
outcomes are calculable. Those potential negative outcomes are
categorized as “risks” in a Knightian sense.50 Where there are risks, the
party with the structural information advantage is best positioned to
accept the risks of negative outcomes because that party is in the best

45. HOWARD L. SHECTER, Earnouts, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD
COMPANY 839 (2011) (“[W]e are worth more than you have offered and we can prove it.”).
46. Leland and Pyle observed that because entrepreneurs, or private sellers, have more
information about their companies than acquirers or other outsiders, transactions with these parties are
highly susceptible to the problem of adverse selection. See generally Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle,
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977).
Freund relies on the language of “lemons” to imply that what is at stake with respect to merger
transactions is adverse selection. See FREUND, supra note 4, at 203.
47. BRUNER, supra note 1, at 615–16; see also Edward D. Herlihy et al., Contingent
Consideration in Bridging Valuation Gaps, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM, Apr. 25, 2012,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/04/25/contingent-consideration-in-bridging-valuation-gaps/
(observing that earnouts are valuable contract provisions in situations of great uncertainty).
48. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 1–10 (1921).
49. Id. at 1–22.
50. The finance literature has taken to use the term “ambiguity” in place of Knight’s
“uncertainty” to differentiate uncertainty from more conventional risk. See, e.g., Larry G. Epstein &
Martin Schneider, Learning Under Ambiguity, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 1275 (2006); Zhengjing Chen &
Larry Epstein, Ambiguity, Risk, and Asset Returns in Continuous Time, 70 ECONOMETRICA 1403 (2002);
see also Peter Bossaerts, Paolo Ghirardato, Serena Guarnaschelli & William R. Zame, Ambiguity in
Asset Markets: Theory and Experiment, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1325 (2010).
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position to prevent the negative result from occurring. The presence of
uncertainty, on the other hand, can present different obstacles to parties
wishing to engage in a transaction. A characteristic of uncertainty, or
ambiguity, is that neither party has an ex ante structural advantage with
respect to knowing whether or not the adverse outcome will come to
pass. In that sense, neither party is necessarily best positioned to accept
the consequences of a negative outcome, as is the case when information
is asymmetric.
Professor Gilson observed that where parties have fundamentally
different views of the future or different preferences for risk, uncertainty
may form a barrier to successful contracting because buyers and sellers
may be unable to efficiently price the seller’s asset.51 According to
Professor Gilson, asset pricing theory assumes that buyers and sellers of
a capital asset, like a corporation, share joint expectations about the
future.52 Expectations for the future are intimately tied to risk
preferences. Where parties do not share the same preferences for risk,
such differences may also undermine efficient pricing. Entrepreneurs
are, by their nature, more risk-loving (that is, they accept larger
variances around the mean outcome) than acquirers. Where buyers and
sellers do not share the same preference for risk, these differences may
violate the assumption of joint expectations leading parties to find
themselves unable to reach a pricing agreement. In this case, the
challenge for buyers and sellers is not asymmetric information as neither
side necessarily has any informational advantage with respect to the
underlying probabilities of future states of the world. Rather, the
challenge for parties is uncertainty and the differences between the
buyer’s and the seller’s risk preferences.
If the parties can agree on a transaction structure that resolves
uncertainty and distributes the relevant probability of an adverse event
to the party with the larger preference for variation, then the parties may
be able to create uniform assumptions and then generate an efficient
price for the seller.53 In this alternate view, uncertainty, rather than
information asymmetries, presents challenges to successful contracting.
Transaction structures, like earnouts, can reduce ex ante uncertainty and
normalize joint expectations with respect to the future value of the
seller.54 The earnout permits buyers to reduce the likelihood that they
will overpay for a seller in the event the future turns out not to be as rosy

51. Professor Ronald Gilson argued that the role of the earnout is to resolve uncertainty and
thereby permit parties to efficiently price the sale of the corporate asset. See Gilson, supra note 16, at
262–65.
52. Id. at 249–57.
53. Id. at 249–65.
54. Id.
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as sellers predicted. Sellers bear the potential cost of their optimism.
Note that sellers do not necessarily have any particular insights into
future states of the world. With an earnout, the sellers simply agree to
bear the costs of being wrong without generating any information for a
potential acquirer.
The competing adverse selection and uncertainty hypotheses are
mutually exclusive hypotheses. In order for earnouts to function as a
credible information signal, earnouts have to be able to generate a
separating equilibrium.55 Where there is a separating equilibrium, the
seller’s choice of contract type, in this case, one including an earnout,
conveys private information from sellers to buyers.56 In a separating
equilibrium, only high quality sellers should self-select into the group of
sellers agreeing to earnout provisions in merger agreements. By virtue
of the seller’s choice of contract, buyers should be able to infer
something about the unobservable quality of the seller.
If, on the other hand, the equilibrium is “pooled,” with both low and
high quality buyers choosing to rely on earnout provisions, the earnout
loses its value as an information signal.57 When both high and low
quality sellers select the same contractual provision, potential buyers are
unable to rely on that selection to infer any information about the
seller’s unobservable quality. Where a pooling equilibrium can be
observed, contractual provisions, like earnouts, lose their signaling
power. In that case, it is more likely that buyers and sellers adopting
earnout provisions are doing so to resolve uncertainty. Where the
parties rely on earnouts to resolve uncertainty, the parties do not intend
to convey information by their choice of contractual provision. Because
there is no expectation that contracts with earnouts in such case will or
should reveal a separating equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium is
consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis.58
IV. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH SUPPORTS ADVERSE SELECTION
HYPOTHESIS
Of the two competing hypotheses, the adverse selection hypothesis is
the dominant hypothesis amongst legal scholars and financial
economists.59 Previous research on the prevalence of contingent
55. See LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 122 (1988) (defining a
separating equilibrium).
56. Cf. id.; see also RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 248: ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS 175–76 (2000) (defining a separating equilibrium).
57. See Phlips, supra note 55 (defining a pooling equilibrium).
58. This is because the results of uncertainty are necessarily a random distribution around a mean
and not necessarily weighted in favor of positive results.
59. See Framing Contract, supra note 3; Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in
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payments in corporate acquisitions provides evidence to support the
claim that contingent payment provisions may be contractual responses
to the lemons problem.60 Where there is unobservable information
about the quality of the seller, sellers can rely on contractual devices to
signal to potential acquirers the credibility of statements they make
regarding their private information.61 Absent a signaling mechanism
like an earnout, sellers may have difficulty in credibly conveying their
unobservable quality to potential buyers.62 In the extreme, these
difficulties might lead to otherwise valuable transactions not going
forward.63 Because there is evidence that parties rely on earnout
mechanisms in circumstances where one expects information
asymmetries to be severe, the conclusion that earnouts may be a
contractual response to adverse selection seems reasonable.64
Contingent payments may act as a screening device to assist sellers to
signal their unobservable quality to uninformed buyers.65 Faced with
the potential for adverse selection, high quality sellers cannot rely on
mere statements about their underlying quality to differentiate
themselves from low quality sellers in the pool of potential sellers. Such
statements lack credibility. Statements can gain credibility when they
are costly to the seller in the event they are incorrect.66 When sellers are
able to make credible statements regarding unobservable data, such
statements help facilitate exchange between sellers with private
information and uninformed buyers by reducing information
Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 861 (2010) (observing that
earnouts are a response to information asymmetries present in the merger transaction).
60. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 151–53; Datar et al., supra note 1, at 201–04; Kohers & Ang,
supra note 1, at 445–48; Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, at 1–5. These studies all pre-date the
implementation of SFAS 141(R). See SFAS 141R, supra note 14. As a result, they are limited to
collection data on the prevalence of contingent earnout provisions from publicly available sources as
well as certain attributes of the transaction. The Datar et al. and Kohers & Ang studies provided some
information on the prevalence of payments. This data was taken from a small sample survey and also
collected from SEC filings. At the time that data was collected there was no uniform reporting
methodology, so the results of these investigations may be difficult to interpret.
61. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of “Screening,” Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 283, 283–84 (1975).
62. Cf. id.
63. See Akerlof, supra note 36.
64. See generally Cain et al., supra note 1; Datar et al., supra note 1; Kohers & Ang, supra note
1; Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, Walton & Kreb, supra note 21. Previous work often uses
“uncertainty” and “adverse selection” interchangeably. See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 1. However,
here I distinguish between adverse selection where sellers have private information with respect to a
particular unknown outcome and symmetrical uncertainty where neither party has an informational
advantage.
65. See Framing Contract, supra note 3; Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the
Informational Structure of Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434 (2002); cf. Spence, supra note 40, at 355–
60; Stiglitz, supra note 61.
66. See generally Framing Contract, supra note 3; Spence, supra note 65.
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asymmetries.
Previous studies of earnout provisions have examined the appearance
of contingent payment devices in merger agreements and generally
found their use consistent with adverse selection hypothesis for earnout
provisions. For example, Professors Kohers and Ang examined the
prevalence of earnout provisions in 938 completed merger transactions
with earnouts over the period 1984 to 1996 and concluded that earnouts
serve two pricing functions: ensure buyers do not overpay for low
quality targets (adverse selection) and reduce any symmetric uncertainty
with respect to valuation.67 Professors Datar, Frankel, and Wolfson also
examined the use of earnout provisions in a sample of merger
agreements from the years 1990–1997 to study the relationship of
buyer/seller characteristics and the likelihood of an earnout.68 The data
suggest that in situations where buyers can reasonably expect severe
information asymmetries, sellers are more likely to agree to earnout
provisions. Datar et al. concluded that earnouts are a contractual
response to the problem of adverse selection because sellers need
credible means to signal private information to buyers.69
Professors Ragazzino and Reuer studied the occurrence of contingent
payments in merger agreements and concluded that contingent earnouts
permit parties to proceed with an acquisition in the face of asymmetric
information. In absence of the earnout provision, Ragazzino and Reuer
hypothesize that parties might be required to rely on alternate
transaction structures (i.e. toeholds) to overcome adverse selection
problems or not to proceed with a transaction at all.70 Ragazzino and
Reuer find that one of the key benefits of contingent earnouts is to
reduce the risk of overpayment due to adverse selection while rewarding
high quality sellers by permitting them to receive higher prices.71
In a more recent study of the structure of earnout provisions,
Professors Cain and Denis conclude that the structure of earnout
provisions is generally consistent with the goal of resolving “adverse
selection/uncertainty” problems and generating ex post incentives to
mitigate the risk of moral hazard amongst continuing shareholders.72

67. See Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at 451–65. Kohers and Ang also find evidence that
contingent payments provide ex post incentives for continuing managers. Id. at 448. Reduction of
symmetric uncertainty is consistent with Gilson’s view of the role of earnouts to resolve uncertainty and
improve pricing for capital assets. See Gilson, supra note 16 (applying the capital asset pricing model to
the pricing of acquisition targets).
68. Datar et al, supra note 1, at 203.
69. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 201–03.
70. Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, at 1–11.
71. Id.
72. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 158–59. Cain et al. conflate the concepts of adverse selection
and uncertainty. For example Cain et al. describe uncertainty in a way that is easily interpreted as
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They find that the size of earnouts is correlated with certain proxies for
the risk involved.73 For example, they find that private targets, where
information asymmetries are presumably larger, accept larger earnouts
than publicly traded targets that accept earnouts, though they do not find
differences in the size of earnouts where the acquirer and the target cross
industries.74 They also find that the earnout period is longer where a
time might be helpful in resolving the uncertainty in question.75 Finally,
they find that when parties select particular earnout targets or triggers,
parties tend to use triggers that are associated with lower information
asymmetries (i.e. sales over profits).76
In general, this previous empirical work suggests that where one
expects severe information asymmetries between buyer and seller,
buyers and sellers rely on earnouts to overcome these problems. For
example, although earnouts tend to be present in a relatively small
percentage (3–7%) of the overall pool of acquisition transactions,
earnouts are much more common in transactions where the seller is a
private firm.77 Consistent with that observation, the American Bar
Association’s 2011 Deal Point’s study of merger agreements involving
private sellers observes that earnouts are present in 38% of transactions
in its sample.78 Professors Koher and Ang found contingent earnouts to
be more common in sellers with fewer shareholders where presumably
selling shareholders have more private information about the seller.79
Professors Datar et al. also found earnouts to be more prevalent in sales

adverse selection when they state, “only targets who truly believe they are valued higher will be willing
to accept contracts in which large portions of their payoffs are contingent on future performance. Thus,
uncertainty-based models predict that earnouts will be larger when there is more uncertainty regarding
target value.” Id. at 158.
73. Id. at 158–160.
74. Id. at 159.
75. Id. at 158–62.
76. Id.
77. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 220 (earnouts present in 5% of private company transactions
while in less than 1% of public company transactions). See also Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at 454
(observing that 66% of their earnout sample involved private company sellers, while earnouts involving
public company sellers were less than 5% of the entire sample) Ragozzino and Reuer found earnouts
present in 5% of private company transactions in their sample. Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, at 8.
Cain et al. observe earnouts in 3.9% of transactions in their sample. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 153.
Bruner provides a summary of a number of studies which surveyed the prevalence of earnouts in
transactions as a whole. See BRUNER, supra note 1, at 612. In transactions involving public company
targets contingent payment provisions are rare. To the extent contingent payments are present in the
public company seller context, parties tend to rely on CVR rather than earnouts. If registered, the CVR
can be publicly traded. Of course, a publicly traded contingent payment device may have less incentive
power than an earnout because the seller can immediately dispose of the risk of adverse consequences
through sales of the CVR in the public markets.
78. See ABA, supra note 10.
79. Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at 446.
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of corporate subsidiaries or divestitures of product lines.80 The
prevalence of earnout transactions in smaller, privately-held firms and
divestitures of subsidiaries of public companies is consistent with a view
that earnouts respond to potential adverse selection. In sales of private
companies or subsidiaries, shareholders are more likely to have access
to private information about the seller than in transactions involving
public company sellers, where there is no reason to suspect that the
widely dispersed shareholder base of the typical public company has any
access to private information about the seller.
In other situations where potential acquirers presumably have less
access to information about the sellers, sellers are more likely to agree to
earnouts. For example, where the acquirer and the target are from two
different industrial sectors, and the information hurdles are likely greater
for the acquirer, one finds buyers and sellers relying more heavily on
earnout provisions.81 This finding is consistent with arguments that
adverse selection is the motivating factor for the earnout. In certain
sectors subject to rapid technical and economic growth, one might also
expect there to be a significant amount of private information. In fact,
transactions involving high technology and business services sector
targets have a higher tendency to include earnouts than banks and other
old line businesses where information about industry participants and
the sector is better-known.82
On the other hand, one would expect where the acquirer has
significant information about the seller, and where one expects there to
be less private information about the seller, that parties would tend not
to rely on transaction structures with contingent consideration. In fact,
earnouts are less prevalent in transactions in industrial sectors that are
characterized by larger numbers of mergers and acquisitions, suggesting
that where acquirers can evaluate the seller in comparison to a large
number of other recent acquisitions in the same sector, the acquirer is

80. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 217–18 (rejecting the null hypothesis that the prevalence of
earnouts in transactions involving subsidiaries is equal to the prevalence of earnouts in all transactions
in the sample).
81. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 227; see also Reuer & Ragozzino, supra note 1, at 17.
82. 12.96% of computer and software (SIC 5045) in their sample employed earnouts, while
0.00% of transactions involving savings institutions (SIC 6035) employed them. Datar et al., supra note
1, at 222. Approximately one-quarter of the transactions employing earnouts in Kohers and Ang’s
sample involved private company sellers in the high-technology sector. Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at
454. Ragazzino and Reuer found that approximately 50% of transactions in their sample involved
earnouts with firms engaged in services, 26.5% in manufacturing and less than 10% engaged in finance,
insurance, and real estate. Ragazzino, supra note 1, at 8. Cain et al. make a similar observation with
33% of targets with earnouts in only five industries computer programming and data processing,
management and public relations services, pharmaceuticals, electronic components, and medical
devices. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 153.
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less concerned about the possible presence of hidden information.83
Finally, one would expect that in transactions that involve insiders
(i.e. management buyouts) there would be fewer earnout provisions than
in other types of transactions. With management on both sides of the
transaction, representatives of the acquirer have as much—if not more—
information than the sellers. As a result, there is little benefit or reason
for the acquirer to rely on an earnout. Consistent with this, Datar et al.
found that where managers participate with the acquiring group, there
are very few earnouts present.84
These previous studies all support the hypothesis that parties use
contingent earnouts in their merger agreements to respond to the
problem of adverse selection. However, because of data limitations, the
focus of these previous studies has generally been limited to claims
about the profiles of acquirers and sellers who might be expected to rely
on earnouts and when one might expect these provisions to appear in
merger agreements. Because sellers are typically small, privately-held
firms, there has been little or no information from the post-closing
period about earnouts and earnout payments until recently. The next
Part of this Article outlines recent changes in disclosure rules related to
earnouts. These new rules require the disclosure of the expected value
of all contingent payments in connection with corporate acquisitions.
The additional transparency provided for by these new rules creates an
opportunity to analyze the use and performance of earnouts in ways that
were previously impossible.
V. THE FAIR VALUE DISCLOSURE OF CONTINGENT PAYMENTS
Until recently, observers have had relatively little information about
the performance of earnouts post-closing. Whether earnouts helped
reveal private information, resolved uncertainty, or whether earnouts
were ever actually paid largely escaped analysis for lack of data. The
FASB recently implemented changes in the rules governing the
accounting for acquisitions, including adoption of the SFAS 141(R),
which went into effect for all companies reporting according to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), beginning with
acquisitions made after December 15, 2008.85 These recent changes
83. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 223, 232.
84. Id. at 212.
85. SFAS 141R, supra note 14, at vi. For a discussion of the implementation of these rules see
Peter Woodlock & Gang Peng, How Will Valuation Changes Affect M&A Deals?, 20 J. CORP. ACC. &
FIN. 49 (2009); see also PAMELA YANAKOPULOS & RETO MICHELUZZI, Mergers & Acquisitions—A
Snapshot: Accounting For Contingent Consideration—Don’t Let Earnouts Lead To Earnings Surprises,
in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2010: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW NOW (2010); Elaine Henry, Oscar J.
Holzmann & Ya-wen Yang, Business Combinations: Accounting Standards Converge, 19 J. CORP.
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make it possible for the first time to gain insight into the post-closing
performance of earnout provisions.86
Under previous accounting rules, contingent payments, like earnouts,
were not required to be disclosed at the time of the acquisition. Rather,
contingent payments were only accounted for at some later point in the
time when the contingency became due or was written off through an
adjustment to the acquirer’s accounting for goodwill.87 Because such
adjustments were not directly tied to the merger transaction, the
acquirer’s financial statements were not transparent with respect to the
treatment of the contingent payments. The lack of transparency in the
acquirer’s financial statements made it difficult for outsiders to observe
the actual performance of earnouts (whether acquirers paid them or
wrote them off) since contingent payments were only recorded if and
when they were actually earned.88 The lack of transparency sometimes
made it difficult to identify whether a particular transaction included any
component of contingent consideration at all.
Under the new SFAS 141(R), contingent consideration must now be
disclosed separately in the footnotes of the acquirer’s financial
disclosures (Forms 10-Q and 10-K) and recognized at its “fair value” on
the acquisition date.89 The fair value is the price that would be received
to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction
between market participants at the measurement date.90 Acquirers are
required to reevaluate that fair value periodically until the contingency is
resolved. When the acquirer revisits its valuation of the earnout
obligation, the fair value must represent the expected value to the
acquirer of the earnout obligation coming due. Gains or losses in the
fair value of contingent payments are recognized explicitly on the
acquirer’s income statement.91 Contingencies may be resolved either by
making payment on the earnout, writing off the earnout, or some

ACCT. & FIN. 73 (2008); Christine Andrews et al., SFAS 141(R): Global Convergence and Massive
Changes in M&A Accounting, 7 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 125 (2009); Jack T. Ciesielski & Thomas R.
Weirich, Business Combinations: New Accounting Guidance, 20 J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 69 (2009).
86. In their 2001 study, Kohers & Ang collected data from the public filings on earnout
payments. They recognized their data were limited by the opacity of disclosure requirements with
respect to contingent payments. See Kohers & Ang, supra note 1. Cain et al. note that accounting
changes will make a study like this one possible. See Cain et al., supra note 1.
87. See SFAS 141R, supra note 14; Andrews et al., supra note 85, at 127.
88. See Marc Asbra & Karen Miles, The Valuation of Earn-outs and Acquired Contingencies
under SFAS 141(R), 79 CPA J. 38 (2009).
89. See SFAS 141R, supra note 14, at 2.
90. Id. This approach to establishing the fair value of an earnout is consistent with fair value
accounting for other intangible (Level III) assets. It relies on an acquirer’s forward looking estimate of
probable cash flows associated with the earnout in order to determine a fair value for the contingent
liability.
91. Id. at 8.
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combination of the two.
To the extent acquirers receive new information about the seller in the
post-closing period, SFAS 141(R) creates some degree of transparency
into the performance of earnouts and the acquisition of information by
the acquirer. For example, after the closing of a transaction with an
earnout, when the acquirer learns private information that causes the
seller to change its estimation about the likelihood of the earnout
becoming payable, this new information must be incorporated into the
then-current fair value of the earnout. If the new information received
during the measuring period indicates an increased likelihood of
payment—because the target is meeting its objectives under the earnout
provision or is otherwise in line to meet those objectives—the acquirer
is required to increase the fair value of the earnout to reflect the
increased likelihood that the acquirer will have to make payment. When
the acquirer raises the fair value estimate, it must reduce its goodwill by
an equivalent amount. On the other hand, if the acquirer receives
information following the closing of a transaction that indicates the
target is less likely to meet the earnout objectives, thus decreasing the
likelihood that the acquirer will be required to make payment on the
earnout, then the acquirer must reduce the fair value estimate of the
earnout. When the acquirer reduces the fair value of a contingent
obligation, the acquirer records an equivalent increase in earnings, or a
“bargain purchase” on its income statement.92 The result of these rule
changes is to require acquirers to disclose to the marketplace whether
they receive positive or negative information related to the seller’s
progress in achieving the earnout during the post-closing period.
The example of OptionsXpress and Optionetics demonstrates how
these rules are put into practice.93 In 2009, OptionsXpress acquired
Optionetics in a merger transaction for $18.4 million plus contingent
payments of up to $35 million, payable in the event Optionetics met
certain financial, technical, and other performance targets during the two
year period following closing. Under previous accounting rules, the
acquisition of Optionetics would be the kind of transaction that might
receive little or no visibility. The general upfront price terms of the
acquisition would be disclosed, but there may not be a disclosure of any
contingent portion of the payment unless and until the contingency
becomes payable. Even in the event a contingency were to become
payable, it would be accounted for through an adjustment to
OptionsXpress’ goodwill and not obviously tied to the Optionetics
92. Andrews et al., supra note 85, at 130. The prospect that an acquirer might be able to engage
in strategic behavior post-closing to undermine the seller’s ability to meet earnout targets and thereby
generate accounting profits is a real one. See text accompanying notes 122–26, infra.
93. See supra Part II.
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acquisition. The accounting for the transaction lacked transparency.
With SFAS 141(R), the accounting treatment of the transaction is
more transparent, and it is easier to observe the performance of the
earnout term.
For example, at the time of the acquisition,
OptionsXpress valued the likelihood that it would be required to make
payment on earnout at $14.5 million, or 41% of the nominal earnout
amount. During the course of the first eight quarters following the
initial disclosure, OptionsXpress regularly updated its fair value
measurements. By the end of the first year, the fair value of the earnout
had declined to $12.13 million. As a result, one year after the merger,
OptionsXpress recorded an increase in earnings on its income statement
equal to the $2.04 million decrease in the fair value of the contingent
payment obligation from the initial estimate of the fair value at the time
of acquisition. By the end of the second year, the fair value of the
earnout declined to $4.81 million and OptionsXpress recorded an
additional increase in earnings of $7.32 million. Ultimately, no earnout
payment was made. One might infer from the decline in the fair values
found in the disclosures that OptionsXpress learned information about
the seller and its business during the course of the first year. This new
information reduced OptionsXpress’ estimate of the seller’s ability to
achieve the earnout goals and thereby trigger a payment.
Figure 1
OptionsXpress fair value disclosures for acquisition of Optionetics
E.O.

FV at Acq.

FV at Q1

FV at Q2

FV at Q3

FV at Q4

Optionetics

$35.0

$14.5

$14.16

$11.9

$12.13

$12.04

+/-

-

($20.5)

($0.34)

($2.26)

$0.23

($0.09)

FV at Q5

FV at Q6

FV at Q7

FV at Q8

E.O. Pmt

FV + Pmt

Optionetics

$8.75

$8.88

$4.81

$4.81

$-

$4.81

+/-

($3.29)

$0.13

($4.06)

$-

$-

($9.69)

By examining the fair value disclosures of a larger number of
transactions, one can develop a near real-time assessment of the
performance of contingent earnout provisions. This assessment can
provide insights into the adequacy of earnouts as contractual responses
to information asymmetries. If sellers are using earnouts as information
signals, as new, positive information is learned during the post-closing
period, one expects to see an increase in the fair value. This increase
would reflect a confirmation of the seller’s optimistic pre-signing
statements. On the other hand, if sellers are not using the earnout
mechanism to signal information to acquirers, then the pattern of post-
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closing fair values should not reflect the separation pattern one expects
with a credible signal.
In assessing the role played by earnout provisions, ideally one would
like to be able to directly observe a seller’s private information. Of
course, this is not possible. However, the new disclosure rules provide a
reasonable, if imperfect, approximation of the acquisition of private
information during the post-closing period. Changes in the fair value of
earnouts over time permit observers to make some assessments about
the extent of private information present in transactions, and the role of
the earnout provision as a contractual response to adverse selection. For
example, if high quality sellers are using earnouts to signal to potential
acquirers their unobservable value, then after closing, one would expect
the acquirer to confirm the seller’s statements through the acquisition of
private information during the earnout’s measuring period.
Confirmation of the seller statements can be observed by outsiders
through regular increases in the fair value of the contingent payment.
On the other hand, if acquirers are unable to confirm pre-signing
statements about the seller’s hidden information during the measuring
period, then fair values should not generate an obvious separating
equilibrium.
Fair value data is a better proxy for assessing the role played by
earnouts than simply payment data alone.94 Fair value data includes two
kinds of information. First, any payments made pursuant to the earnout
provision are included in the fair value of the earnout. This payment
data is usually a backward-looking assessment of whether the seller
achieved the targets under the earnout provision. However, payment
data alone can be misleading because the payment data by itself does not
indicate whether the acquirer learned any previously hidden seller
information prior to making the payment or even if the target achieved
the stated earnout targets.95 The mere fact that a backward-looking
payment has been made does not confirm one way or the other the
hypothesis that earnouts are contractual responses to the problem of
adverse selection.
The second component of fair value data is a forward-looking
estimate of the seller’s future performance. Fair value estimates require
a determination by the acquirer of the future likelihood that the seller
might achieve earnout targets. Accurate estimates about the future
94. Two previous studies have assembled some partial payment data from public filings. See
Kohers & Ang, supra note 1; Cain et al, supra note 1.
95. Where a large number of the earnout recipients remain with the acquirer as continuing
employees of the seller, the acquirer may have an incentive for morale reasons and others to make
earnout payments even if they have not been earned. Where continuing employees have developed an
expectation of receiving the earnout the cost to the acquirer of not making payment and discouraging
continuing employees may be high relative to the cost of simply making a payment.
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likelihood of an earnout payment becoming payable depend on
information. As the acquirer learns more information about the seller,
including assimilating the seller’s private information during the postclosing period, the acquirer is in a better position to revise and make a
more accurate estimate of the seller’s likelihood to achieve the earnout
targets. When positive information is added to the acquirer’s total mix
of information, the fair value estimate of the earnout payment should
increase to reflect the addition of new, positive information. When the
acquirer learns new, negative information, the acquirer lowers the fair
value estimate to reflect the new estimate of the true likelihood of the
seller meeting the earnout targets. As a result, changes to forwardlooking fair value data are a reasonable, if not perfect, proxy for postclosing private information.
A. The Sample
In order to create the sample for this study, I conducted a search of
the SDC Platinum M&A Database for acquisition transactions (mergers,
asset sales, stock purchase agreements, and tender offers) involving
public and private targets announced during the period from 2006 to
2009.96 Because earlier work confirms that earnouts are more prevalent
in transactions involving private firms, I did not include a lower dollar
threshold on the transaction size for my search. I also excluded any
transactions where the seller was in bankruptcy proceedings. This broad
search generated an initial set of 22,000 transactions.
I narrowed this pool further to include only those transactions that
disclosed an earnout component as part of the overall consideration.
This reduced the pool of transactions to 738 transactions. The overall
incidence of earnouts in my sample (3.35%) was consistent with those
of previous studies of earnouts.97 I then discarded any transactions that
were announced prior to implementation of SFAS 141(R) on January 1,
2009. The total number of transactions announced during the calendar
year of 2009 with earnouts for which acquirers were required to make
fair value disclosures was 140.
Finally, I reduced the pool even more by eliminating transactions
with foreign (47) or private (27) acquirers who were not required to
make public filings. I also eliminated from the pool those transactions
with U.S. acquirers who, for whatever reason, did not comply with the
disclosure requirements (10). This produced a final pool of fifty-six
96. SDC Platinum Database (available through subscription with Thomson Reuters Financial
Securities Data).
97. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 153; Datar et al., supra note 1, at 220; Ragozzino & Reuer, supra
note 1, at 8.
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transactions for which the acquirers made public disclosures of the fair
value of contingent payments during each of the quarterly measuring
periods following announcement of the transaction. The fair value data
for this sample was hand-collected from corporate 10-K and 10-Q
filings.
The composition of the resulting sample is largely consistent with
samples in previous studies. As with previous studies, the targets
identified are predominantly private firms or divisions of public
companies.
Eleven transactions (19.3%) involve divestitures of
subsidiaries. Only one target in the sample of fifty-six firms was a
publicly traded firm.98
Statutory mergers are the predominant
transaction form (54%) with asset purchases and stock purchase
agreements (33% and 12%, respectively) also represented.
Again, largely consistent with previous studies, 41% of transactions
with an earnout involve cross-industry pairings where one might expect
acquirers to be at an information disadvantage with respect to sellers.
The use of earnouts is concentrated in a small number of sectors, as
defined by their two-digit Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC). Just
five sectors (business services (SIC73), medical devices and instruments
(SIC38),
engineering
and
management
services
(SIC87),
pharmaceuticals and chemicals (SIC28), as well as electronics and other
equipment (SIC36)) account for more than 75% of all transactions in the
sample with earnouts.

98. The single instance of a publicly traded firm using an earnout from the data set was Edwards
Lifesciences Corp.
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Figure 2
Two Digit SIC (Top five)
Target

16

Acquirer
17

Business Services (73)
7

5

Engineering & Management Services (87)
8

6

Instruments & Related Products (38)
6

9

Chemicals & Allied Prod. (28)
5

6

Electronic & Other Equipt. (36)

On average, the earnout component of the merger consideration is
significant, comprising approximately 34.6% of the total consideration
available in the transaction. In 20% of the transactions, the amount of
consideration theoretically available to sellers as part of the earnout is
larger than the initial consideration available in the transaction. These
outsized earnout amounts are concentrated in the pharmaceuticals sector
(6 of 11). There are a small number (5) of larger transactions (greater
than $200 million in total transaction value) with earnouts. Of those
five transactions, four are in the pharmaceuticals sector with an earnout
milestones tied to FDA approval of the target drug.
In the
pharmaceuticals sector in particular, the average value of transactions
with earnouts is $334 million with the size of the average earnout in that
sector equal to $229 million (68.5% of the total consideration).
Reliance on the earnout in the pharmaceutical sector is consistent with
an understanding that the future value of the seller is tied to events that
are not yet known or where there is still hidden information with respect
to the viability of the seller’s product to achieve government approval.
Outside of the pharmaceuticals sector, the magnitude of contingent
consideration is significantly lower, representing only 30.5% of total
consideration.
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Figure 3
Stated
d Earnouts ass % of Total Consideratiion
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Whille the pharmaaceutical sector may rely on relativelyy large earno
outs,
the majority of earn
nouts are conccentrated in rrelatively sm
mall transactioons.
More th
han 30% of transactions
t
in
i the samplee have a trannsaction valuee of
less thaan $10 milliion, with mo
ore than 50%
% of transacctions havinng a
transacttion value off less than $25
$ million. Approximaately 75% off all
transacttions in the sample
s
are leess than $1000 million. Thhis is consisttent
with previous obserrvations that earnouts are present in sm
mall and privvate
compan
ny transactiions where there is presumably more privvate
informaation about th
he seller.
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Figure 4
Size
S of Transa
actions with Earnouts
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%
%
5%
5%
%

3%

0%
%

With
h respect to the paymeent triggers or milestonnes for earnnout
paymen
nts, 54% are tied to selleer revenue taargets. Fourtteen percent are
tied to FDA and/or regulatory approvals
a
of the seller’s m
main product or
drug. An addition
nal four perccent are tiedd to technicaal targets. T
The
balancee of earnout milestones (29%) are ttied to perfoormance targgets,
which include
i
somee combination
n of revenue , profitabilityy, technical, and
other market
m
perfo
ormance targ
gets. The aaverage discllosed lengthh of
earnoutts in the saample is 2.1
19 years, w
with approxim
mately 39% of
earnoutts lasting on
nly one yeaar. Regulatoory earnoutss tend to hhave
slightly
y longer duraations, averaging 2.28 yeears. Revennue earnouts,, on
the other hand, tend to be shorrter, with 65 % of them llasting no m
more
than on
ne year.
In on
nly a small number
n
of traansactions (5 %) did the aacquirer discllose
any target managem
ment compen
nsation as a component oof the earnoouts.
ucity of earn
nouts for con
ntinuing mannagers may bbe explainedd by
The pau
new acccounting ru
ules that req
quire any coontingent paayments tiedd to
manageers’ continuin
ng employmeent with the sseller—and nnot to status aas a
former shareholdeer—be alloccated as a compensattion expensse.99
Conseq
quently, the fair
f values off earnouts ass currently diisclosed rem
move
any com
mponent thatt might be reaasonably inteended to resoolve seller mooral
hazard problems. Of course, it is posssible that w
where there are
99. See SFAS 141R, supra
s
note 14.
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continuing employees, a significant number of them are also
shareholders. However, their status as continuing employees does not
affect their ability to receive a payment pursuant to the terms of the
earnout provision; therefore as compared to an employment contract
with a performance bonus, the earnout is not an efficient mechanism for
managing potential seller moral hazard.100
B. Post-Closing Performance of Fair Value Disclosures
Examining the fair value disclosures may help resolve whether sellers
are relying on earnouts to signal private information to potential
acquirers and thus whether earnouts act as a contractual response to the
problem of adverse selection, or, if in the alternative, earnouts simply
resolve the problem of pre-contractual uncertainty. High quality sellers
using the earnout to signal private information should exhibit a pattern
of increases in fair value estimates as acquirers confirm the sellers’
information during the post-closing period. Such a pattern would be
evidence of a separating equilibrium and suggest that high quality sellers
rely on earnouts to signal hidden information. In the alternative, if
acquirers and sellers are relying on earnouts for reasons other than to
signal private information—for instance, to resolve symmetrical
uncertainty—then one should not observe a separating equilibrium. If
uncertainty motivates the reliance on earnouts, then the post-closing
performance of fair value disclosures should be similarly stochastic to
reflect that motivation.
A histogram of the fair value data shows the development of fair
values over time. In general, acquisition acquirers tended to be
relatively optimistic about the likelihood of the seller to meet the stated
earnout targets and thus trigger payments under the earnout provision.
Nearly 40% of acquirers estimated that the target would be able to meet
or exceed the stated value of the earnout. By the end of the second year
during the post-closing period, however, acquirers were decidedly more
pessimistic, with 25% of acquirers essentially writing off the entire
earnout payment. To the extent one is concerned whether sellers rely on
earnouts to signal private information about their unobservable quality,
this large increase in write-offs following closing suggests that acquirers
learn negative information in the post-closing period that does not
confirm seller pre-contractual statements.

100. See infra notes 122–26.
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Figure 5
Fair Va
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d positive information ab
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For example,
e
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a
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conting
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of the first
f
year of the
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d
to 677.8% of the nnominal earnnout
available, including
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nts made pur suant to the eearnout. By the
end of the second year of the earnout, th e mean fair value estim
mate
(includiing any paym
ments) decliined to 52.9 8% of the nnominal earnnout
available.101 The median fairr value (inclluding any payments) aalso

101. The fair value esstimates include all
a reported paymeents pursuant the earnout. Almost forty
percent (39.3%) of all tran
nsactions in the saample disclosed ssome payments puursuant to the earrnout
provision first
f
four quarters following announ
ncement of the trannsaction. By the end of the secondd year
following announcement, 64.3%
6
of all transsactions report att least some paym
ments pursuant too the
earnout pro
ovision. Where th
here was a paymen
nt, the average payyment was equal too 41.6% of the nom
minal
earnout av
vailable during the first year and 68%
% of the nominal eaarnout available dduring the second yyear.
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declined from 79.3% to 43.5% over the same time period. Had sellers
been relying on the earnout to signal hidden information then one would
expect the difference in means from the fair value at announcement and
two years following announcement to be significant and positive.
Instead, the t-statistic is significant (p value=0.006) and the mean
estimate has declined over the two year measuring period.102
Figure 3
Fair Value Disclosures, All Transactions
Fair Value

Fair Value + Payments

Fair Value + Payments

at Acquisition

at 1 Year

at 2 Years

70.1%
Mean (All

67.8%

52.98%**

(p value 0.618)

(p value 0.006)

transactions)

**indicates significance at the 95% level.

Although the difference in means is significant, one cannot claim that
sellers are using the earnout to signal unobservable positive information
about the seller. Rather than suggest that the acquirer has learned new
hidden information that reveals the seller not to be a lemon, the decline
in fair values may be attributed to new negative information received by
the acquirer over the course of two years following closing. This result
is inconsistent with an interpretation that buyers and sellers rely on
earnouts to signal hidden information to potential acquirers. On the
other hand, it is consistent with an interpretation that buyers and sellers
rely on earnouts to resolve symmetrical uncertainty. Although earnouts
may play a role in reducing uncertainty and distributing the risk of
adverse outcomes, one cannot claim from the fair value data that
earnouts play a role in signaling positive hidden information to acquirers
prior to contracting.
Previous studies posited that information asymmetries are more
extreme where acquirers and sellers come from different industrial
sectors.103 These studies concluded that adverse selection thus accounts
for the increased likelihood of parties relying on earnout provisions in

102. Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test for small samples yields similar results: the z statistic for a
two tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test is 2.95 (p value: 0.0032, Ns/r: 51).
103. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1.
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such transactions.104 Where the acquirer is from a different SIC than the
seller, the acquirer may have little or no basis to make a reasonable
assessment of the seller’s value or its prospects prior to the acquisition.
In 41.1% of transactions in the sample, the acquirer and the seller did
not share the same two-digit SIC. In these transactions, the average fair
value of contingent payments at the announcement of the acquisition
was 71.1% of the nominal earnout available. By the end of four quarters
of disclosures, the average fair value of contingent payments (net of any
payments) fell to just 55.0% of the nominal earnout available. At the
end of eight quarters, the fair value of contingent payments for
transactions across industrial groups declined to just 40.3% of the
nominal earnout available.
A two sided t-test for the difference in means for the fair value of
earnout payments two years after announcement permits us to reject the
null hypothesis that sellers from different industrial sectors as their
acquirers rely on earnouts to signal hidden information. Rather than
exhibit an increase in the fair value of the earnout, acquirers from
different industrial sectors discounted the fair values. The t-statistic for
the decline in the mean fair value two years after acquisition is
significant and negative (p value 0.0004). This result suggests that
acquirers received negative information about the seller during the postclosing period, and, to the extent acquirers were relying on earnouts to
resolve adverse selection, they were unable to confirm any seller presigning statements.
On the other hand, where acquirers and sellers are from the same
industrial code, the declines in the fair values of contingent payments
are not as significant, although they do decline from 69.3% to 61.8%
over the first two years. The t-statistic for the mean fair value for
transactions in which the acquirer and the seller shared the same SIC
was not significant (p value 0.359). This result suggests that acquirers
received no information, either positive or negative, during the two
years following announcement of the acquisition that would affect its
initial valuation of the earnout contingency. This result is consistent
with an interpretation that parties rely on earnouts to resolve
uncertainties rather than adverse selection.

104. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1.
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Figure 4
Fair Value Disclosures, SIC
Fair Value

Fair Value

Fair Value

at Acquisition

at 1 Year

at 2 Years

70.1%

67.8%

52.98%**

69.3%

76.7%

61.8%

(p value 0.161)

(p value 0.359)

55.0%**

40.3%**

(p value 0.037)

(p value 0.0004)

All transactions

Acquirer Same SIC
71.1%
Acquirer Difference
SIC

** indicates significance at the 95% level.

Where buyers acquire sellers from different industrial sectors, one
expects there to be more information asymmetries. If the earnout played
a role in helping resolve those asymmetries, one would expect to see
acquirers confirm pre-signing seller statements during the post-closing
period through an increase in the fair values of contingent payments.
The observed decline in fair values is not consistent with an
interpretation that parties rely on earnouts to overcome adverse
selection. Earnouts do not appear to generate the additional positive
information during the post-closing period that one might expect if the
earnout were intended to signal hidden information across industrial
sectors. The decline in observed fair values is consistent with the
alternative theory that parties rely on earnouts to resolve uncertainty
rather than signal information.
Previous studies posited that there may be particular industries (i.e.
high growth technology industries or services) where information
asymmetries may be more extreme. Those studies found that earnouts
are more prevalent in industries where information asymmetries are
thought to be more extreme.105 For example, earnouts are more
prevalent in transactions involving sellers in business services, high
technology, medical devices and the pharmaceutical industry. In those
industries, there is a plausible argument that sellers have hidden
information that they might have difficulty credibly conveying to an

105. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1.
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acquirer.106 With the exception of earnouts in the pharmaceuticals
sector (SIC 28), the estimated fair values of earnouts declined in
transactions across all sectors. T-tests on the fair value means of
earnouts two years following announcement of the transaction permit us
to reject the null hypothesis that sellers rely on earnouts to signal hidden
information. With respect to all sectors represented, except the
pharmaceuticals sector, the fair value data suggests that acquirers did
not learn private information in the post-closing period that confirmed
pre-signing seller statements. These results are consistent with an
alternate hypothesis that earnouts play a role in reducing uncertainty and
distributing the risk of adverse outcomes, but do not necessarily
facilitate the credible transmission of hidden information between the
parties prior to contracting.
Figure 5: Fair Value Disclosures, by Two Digit SIC
At Acquisition

At 1 Year

At 2 Years

70.1%

67.8%

52.98%**

66.8%

68.41%

47.7%

(p value 0.813)

(p value 0.154)

All transactions

Target SIC

73. Business Services
94.8%
87. Engineering & Management

81.2%

52.7%

(p value 0.373)

(p value 0.084)

67.6%

47.9%

(p value 0.526)

(p value 0.064)

58.2%

51.8%

(p value 0.096)

(p value 0.975)

Services
76.4%
38. Instruments/Medical Devices
51.3%
28. Pharmaceuticals/Chemicals

**indicates significance at the 95% level.

Earlier studies have also posited that transactions involving the
acquisition of divisions or product lines from sellers would also be
106. The rationale for business services having large numbers of earnouts is not likely related to
adverse selection, but rather more closely related to moral hazard.
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susceptible to severe information asymmetries.107 Because such sales
involve businesses that do not stand alone and are often highly
integrated into other associated businesses, it may be difficult for
potential acquirers to disaggregate and identify sources of value in these
targets. As a result, sellers may have private information about the
sellers’ prospects that are difficult to convey credibly to buyers. The
changes in the mean fair value of earnouts associated with division sales
are not statistically different from zero (p value 0.904). This is
consistent with an interpretation that the acquirer has not learned any
information during the post-closing period that would affect the
acquirer’s estimate of the likelihood of the seller to meet the earnout
objectives. It is also consistent with the alternate hypothesis that
earnouts reduce uncertainty and distribute risk, rather than convey
hidden information from sellers to buyers prior to contracting.
Figure 6: Fair Value Disclosures, Divestiture/Not Divestiture
At Acquisition

At 1 Year

At 2 Years

70.1%

67.8%

52.98%**

73.5%

72.7%

68.6%

(p value 0.955)

(p value 0.904)

All transactions

Divesture
69.2%
Not Divesture

66.6%

49.2%**

(p value 0.582)

(p value 0.008)

**indicates significance at the 95% level.

It is possible that sellers rely on particular earnout milestones to
signal private information to acquirers. For example, sellers may use
technical or regulatory milestones to signal their relative confidence
about unobservable attributes of the seller’s value. During post-closing
periods, as acquirers are able to confirm seller pre-signing statements
with respect to technical capacity or regulatory progress, then the fair
value of contingent payments should rise to reflect this new information.
However, the observed fair value data (including any payments) tied to
nonfinancial milestones does not suggest the acquirers learned positive,
new information during the post-closing period. The observed declines

107. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1.
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suggest it is consistent with the alternate hypothesis that earnouts
resolve post-closing uncertainty.
Figure 7: Fair Value Disclosures, by Targets
At Acquisition
68.5%
Revenue Targets
66.0%
Performance Targets
70.2%
Regulatory Targets
98.9%
Technical Targets

At 1 Year

At 2 Years

59.2%

50.5%**

(p value 0.201)

(p value 0.023)

75.0%

61.7%

(p value 0.282)

(p value 0.441)

79.3%

48.1%

(p value 0.413)

(p value 0.073)

98.2%

39.9%

(p value 0.500)

(p value 0.298)

**indicates significance at the 95% level

As neither party has any inherent advantage in predicting the future of
the economy, targets tied to revenue performance may be better
understood as resolving the problem of symmetrical uncertainty rather
than adverse selection. When general economic conditions are weak, as
was the case during the sample period, one expects that sellers may be
unable to meet earnout targets. Thus the data is consistent with an
interpretation that earnouts do not generate valuable signals but rather
permit parties to shift exogenous uncertainty to one party or the other.
Thus, rather than address adverse selection, earnouts tied to revenue of
the seller are probably better understood as resolving uncertainty.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The conventional wisdom amongst the academy with respect to
earnout provisions is that these provisions help guard acquirers against
adverse selection in the context of an acquisition. The alternate view,
common amongst practitioners, is that earnouts are a device to manage
uncertainty. Although earlier studies found that earnouts are more likely
to be employed by dealmakers in situations where one expects
information asymmetries to be more severe, the data above suggest that
sellers do not rely on earnouts to signal their unobservable quality to
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acquirers.
There are two important conclusions one can draw from the fair value
accounting data. First, to the extent sellers might intend to rely on
earnouts to respond to the problem of adverse selection in pre-signing
negotiations, earnouts appear to do a poor job of sorting high quality
sellers from low quality sellers. During the post-closing period,
acquirers do not systematically report receiving private information to
confirm the pre-signing optimism of sellers. Because acquirers are not
able to confirm pre-signing seller statements systematically, we do not
observe a separating equilibrium. Without a separation between high
and low quality sellers, earnouts cannot function as a credible
information signal in response to adverse selection.108 Consequently,
the post-closing disclosure data does not support the adverse selection
hypothesis.
Second, although earnouts may fail to serve a useful signaling
function, this does not necessarily mean they are not valuable in the
contracting process. Sellers may be relying on earnouts for reasons
other than sending signals about their private information. Rather than
resolve adverse selection, parties may be relying on earnouts to resolve
problems of uncertainty that present themselves during the process of
pricing an acquisition consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis.
Resolving symmetrical uncertainty, or “bridging the valuation gap,”
during the pre-contractual phase can assist parties in overcoming an
important contracting challenge.109 To the extent contingent payment
provisions do not elicit new information but simply allocate adverse
costs of uncertain events to the seller, they undertake an important
distributive function that permits parties to move forward and create
joint value.110 By creating uniform expectations with respect to any one
of a number of uncertainties, the earnout mechanism permits parties to
normalize their joint expectations about the future and thus agree on a
pricing formula for the seller where, in the absence of uniform joint
expectations, parties might not be able to reach agreement.111
108. In order for a signal to be valuable, sellers must all uniformly use the signal in the same
manner. If sellers are not uniformly using the earnout mechanism to convey private information to
potential acquirers, the earnout is unable to generate a separating equilibrium and loses its potential
value as a credible information signal due to acquirer confusion. See infra notes 14–18.
109. Memorandum from Arthur Wright, Jennifer Avery, and Melissa Deal on Analysis and
Guidance for Use of Earnouts, Judicial Interpretations Working Grp. of the ABA M&A Committee
(Aug. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
110. Resolving distributive challenges to transactions is important. Distributive challenges can
often result in parties not pursuing what are otherwise socially valuable transactions. ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 17–23
(2000) (discussing how distributive challenges can prevent otherwise socially valuable transactions from
going forward).
111. See Gilson, supra note 16.
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Although essentially distributive in nature, a contingent payment that
resolves pre-contractual uncertainty permits parties to engage in a value
enhancing transaction. The earnout distributes the consequences of
adverse outcomes to the party with the higher tolerance for it and in that
way helps facilitate pricing and accomplishment of the transaction.
Because sellers may have a higher tolerance for risk during the sale
process, due perhaps to an optimism bias, they may be more willing to
defer some portion of their compensation and accept the risk of adverse
outcomes in order to accomplish the transaction.112 Buyers are
protected from potentially overpaying in the event the future state of the
world is not as rosy as portrayed by the sellers, and sellers receive some
upside in the event that they are. By resolving uncertainty in the precontractual phase in favor of the acquirer, earnouts can help both parties
reach an efficient price without necessarily eliciting any private
information about the seller.113
A key implication of these results is a suggestion for modesty in
claims made of those of us who study transactional law.114 The essence
of the nascent study of transactional law is that economic incentives
drive the contracting process, including the structure of the transaction
and the content of the contracts.115 By understanding these incentives

112. Bruner notes that earnouts might also have an option value for sellers. See BRUNER, supra
note 1, at 615–16. It may be that some sellers treat an earnout like an option. In the option model, a low
quality seller may accept an out-of-the-money earnout option because it is valuable to the seller given
the seller’s risk tolerance, even if the probability of the earnout becoming payable is small. For a riskloving seller there may little downside to accepting an earnout and there is potentially a large upside.
My colleague, Renee Jones, calls this the “lottery effect” of the earnout.
113. See Gilson, supra note 16.
114. Interest by legal academics in transactional law has been growing in recent years as
demonstrated by the growth of “Deals” courses as well as the establishment of a provisional
transactional lawyering section by the AALS. For instance, I teach a “Deals” course at the Boston
College Law School that is based on similar courses offered at Columbia Law School, Stanford Law
School, as well as at a growing list of law school across the United States. In 2010, Drexel Law School
sponsored the first ever transactional lawyering moot court as part of more general effort to formalize
transactional lawyering skills development. In 2011, the AALS started a new section on Transactional
Lawyering and Skills as part of the broader move to recognize and develop a normative approach to the
teaching of transactional lawyering.
115. An approach to the study of transactional lawyering heavily influenced by the field of
transaction cost economics has been taken up by many, including myself, in the years since Professor
Gilson’s article was first published. See, e.g., Framing Contract, supra note 3 (describing the “Deals”
project); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010) (proposing a theory of
regulatory arbitrage based largely in transaction cost economics); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel &
Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction Of Formal and Informal Contracting In Theory, Practice,
and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) (considering the effects of combining formal and
informal contracting on transaction structures); Brian JM Quinn, Asset Specificity and Transaction
Structures: A Case Study of @Home Corporation, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 77 (2010) (analyzing the
information problems that influenced the structuring of the @Home Corp.); Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon
Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239 (1995) (applying Gilson’s
transactional lawyering approach to the work of lawyers in the venture capital industry); Albert Choi &
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and transaction costs, economics lawyers can improve the ability of
lawyers to design contractual provisions and transaction structures that
will create value for clients.116 In part, it is this perspective that
motivates the adverse selection hypothesis for earnouts.
However, the results from the fair value data with respect to the
reported performance of earnouts suggest that we should approach the
transactional lawyering project with some degree of modesty. Although
earnouts may be prevalent in circumstances where one might expect
adverse selection to be a potential problem, there is little evidence to
suggest that earnouts actually function to sort high quality sellers from
low quality sellers. Rather, contingent payment provisions are more
likely to resolve questions of uncertainty. Though the resolution of
uncertainty can be critical to ensuring parties are able to price
transactions efficiently, where unknown future states of the world may
make it impossible for parties to otherwise accomplish a transaction, it
may appear less analytically ambitious than the prospect of contingent
payments resolving information problems that might present challenges
to transactions. While this result does not suggest that an approach to
the study of transactions based on transaction cost economics is
unworthy, it does suggest there may be real limits to relying exclusively
on this approach when thinking about contracting.117
Of course, there is power in using the transaction cost model to
analyze complex transactions, but the model has its limits. Economic
models are not intended to be precisely predictive of real-world
behavior. Their power comes from the ability of models to help us
break down complex, real-world transactions into their essential
components. This is not always a simple task and there is ample room

George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119
YALE L. J. 848 (2010) (analyzing the effects of information problems on contract design); D. Gordon
Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that lawyers
add value by doing much more than simply minimizing transaction costs).
116. For a detailed discussion of the motivation behind the various “Deals” courses and how
transactional lawyering can generate value for clients, see Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate
Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 475 (2002). For a discussion
of a normative approach to corporate lawyering and the education of deal lawyers, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 486 (2007);
Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15 (1995); Tina L. Stark,
Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223 (2004); George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as
Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279 (2009). The development of “Deals” courses over the past
decade dovetails with recent recognition that law schools have an obligation to train “client-ready”
lawyers and the fact that firms, and more importantly their clients, are less willing to pay for the years of
apprenticeship-like training that gave earlier generations of legal professionals to space to develop dealmaking instincts. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
117. Of course, the challenge of translating economic models to real life is not solely a problem of
transactional lawyering.
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for specification error.118 In this case, the new disclosure data suggests
a specification error in the analysis of the role of earnouts in merger
agreements. Rather than resolve adverse selection, the disclosure data
suggests we specify the role of contingent payments as one of resolving
uncertainty, and not one of a credible signal for private information. To
the extent earnouts respond to uncertainty, the ex ante distribution of
outcomes with respect to the fair values is indeterminate. The presence
of the earnout itself generates no particular information for a third party.
When specified in that way, the fact that the fair value of earnouts
declines over time and that earnouts are not paid out does not
necessarily raise any concern about the efficacy of earnout provisions.
These results are merely stochastic ex post results that reflect the
uncertainty of contracting. The earnout may be better understood as a
risk allocation tool. The difference is subtle, but significant, during the
contracting phase.
VII. REMAINING QUESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Although the fair value data is generally at odds with the view that
contingent payments are a contractual response to adverse selection,
there may be alternative ways to explain the disclosure data that do not
wholly discount the adverse selection hypothesis. First, it is possible
that the reason for the relatively poor performance of contingent
earnouts relative to acquirer expectations is related to some exogenous
variable, such as overall economic performance. According to this
explanation, parties rely on earnouts to signal private information about
their underlying quality, but poor economic conditions generally have
made it impossible for sellers to meet the earnout targets. Of course, it
is true that general economic conditions following the financial crisis of
2008 may have negatively impacted both seller and acquirer
performance. Therefore, the fact that sellers are unable to achieve the
thresholds required to trigger contingent payments might be wholly
unremarkable. However, the transactions included in this sample were
all announced following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis and
subsequent recession. Consequently, the initial estimates of earnout
values disclosed by acquirers in this sample were made at a time when
acquirers had an opportunity to incorporate the effects of the poor
economic environment into their expectations for the target’s
performance. Indeed, in early 2009 when the first of the sample’s
transactions were announced, the economic crisis and economic future

118. See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 1 (conflating the concepts of “uncertainty” and “adverse
selection).
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appeared most dire. It was in that environment that many of the initial
estimates of seller performance were made. One expects that acquirers
would have already incorporated that poor economic outlook into their
estimates of seller performance at the time the transactions were
announced.
In any event, if it were the case that general economic conditions
were the cause of sellers’ inability to meet earnout milestones, and if
earnouts were nevertheless relied upon by parties to signal private
information, then one would still expect to see a separating equilibrium
with respect to the performance of earnouts with nonfinancial targets. If
parties are using nonfinancial targets to signal private information, the
fair values of those earnouts should be unrelated to exogenous economic
conditions. However, one does not observe a significant increase in
performance in earnouts with nonfinancial targets. If sellers were
relying on earnouts to signal private nonfinancial information during
poor economic times, we still would expect to see a separating
equilibrium confirming private information. We do not observe that
result, however. Thus, it is more likely that earnouts are intended to
protect to acquirers precisely from the kind of unexpected negative
economic performance that we have experienced in recent years
(symmetrical uncertainty) and not to signal private information.
Second, it is still early with respect to disclosure data. This study is
the first of its kind to be conducted following implementation of SFAS
141(R). It is possible that firms may not yet be adequately or even
accurately complying with the disclosure requirements. For example, in
the original sample of 140 transactions, a number of observations (9)
were dropped because the acquirers failed for some reason to comply
with their disclosure obligations under SFAS 141(R). As firms gain
more experience over time with fair value estimates of contingent
payment obligations, they may become more adept at generating
accurate estimates, which may influence future interpretations of the
data, including the possible observation of a separation equilibrium
related to earnouts. Of course, firms have had at least five years of
experience with fair value accounting in other contexts so the extent of
additional learning may be limited. For example, fair value accounting
for Level 3 Assets already requires firms to make similar quarterly
assessments with respect to the impairments to goodwill following
acquisitions.119
Firms were able to implement those standards
successfully before the implementation of contingent consideration
accounting.

119. See FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO.
157 (2010), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas157.pdf.
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Third, it may be possible that the inability to observe a separating
equilibrium is simply the result of overly conservative accounting
practices by acquirers. Accounting determinations are necessarily
judgment calls by managers based upon information in hand at the time
of the estimate. Managers of acquirers may have internal motivations,
not related to the seller’s performance, to discount the likelihood of an
earnout obligation becoming due. In this critique, buyers may
overestimate the true fair value of the contingent payment at
acquisition—essentially taking an earnings bath at the time of the
acquisition. Then, as time goes on, the acquirer adjusts the fair value of
the earnout obligation to more realistic levels. Because this overly
conservative approach almost always means that buyers over-estimate
the likelihood of making payments, it suggests that fair values of
contingent payments will always decline over time. It also suggests that
buyers use contingent payments to store “cookie jar reserves,” adjusting
fair values as required in order to generate accounting profits.120 This
critique has some merit. However, if it is true that fair value disclosures
are not a fair and accurate representation of an earnout’s expected value,
but simply a function of the acquirer’s requirement for cookie jar
reserves, then fair value accounting rules fail to provide the transparency
originally intended by rulemakers. If these rules do not provide
additional transparency into the real risks facing businesses, then it
raises larger questions across a variety of areas beyond contingent
payments where investors rely on fair value standards for their
investment decision making and raises doubts more generally about the
efficacy of the FASB’s fair value accounting project.121
Finally, it is possible that although sellers attempt to use earnouts to
signal hidden information, these attempts are not reflected in the fair
value data because of confounding information asymmetries affecting
the acquirer. In particular, acquirers face a well-known moral hazard
during the post-closing period that may overwhelm the signaling effect
of an earnout.122 This moral hazard may lead to disagreements between
the parties over the proper fair value of the earnout and the ability of
sellers to achieve the earnout. Anecdotal accounts suggest that earnouts
generate many disputes or litigation among the parties. For example, in
the 2009 Delaware Chancery Court case, Aveta, Inc. v. Bengoa, Vice
120. CHARLES W. MULFORD & EUGENE E. COMISKEY, THE FINANCIAL NUMBERS GAME:
DETECTING CREATIVE ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 51 (2002) (defining “cookie jar” reserves as an overly
aggressive accrual of operating expenses and the creation of liability accounts done in an effort to
reduce future-year operating expenses).
121. In this Article, I do not intend to call into question the efficacy of the fair value accounting
project. I merely take it at face value.
122. See Victor P. Goldberg, In Search of Best Efforts: Reinterpreting Bloor v. Falstaff, 44 ST.
LOUIS U. L. J. 1465, 1476 (2000).
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Chancellor Travis Laster noted that “[e]arn outs frequently give rise to
disputes.”123 In another recent case in the Chancery Court, Airborne
Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, the same jurist observed:
[A]n earnout . . . typically reflects [a] disagreement over the value of the
business that is bridged when the seller trades the certainty of less cash at
closing for the prospect of more cash over time . . . But since value is
frequently debatable and the causes of underperformance equally so, an
earnout often converts today’s disagreement over price into tomorrow’s
124
litigation over the outcome.

Searches of public records uncover few complaints related to
contingent payments. This paucity of lawsuits is not necessarily
evidence that the conventional wisdom with respect to the propensity of
earnouts to generate disputes is incorrect.125 Indeed, the cases found in
the opinion and docket searches suggest why there is little evidence in
the public record of earnout disputes. Earnout provisions, like the one
negotiated in the TRS Institute v. Transcend Services, tend to require
that disputes be brought to private arbitration rather than through the
courts.126 Consequently, it is likely that the public records drastically
undercount the true rate of disputes related to the implementation of
earnout provisions. Where the nature of the disputes is made public,
disputes between parties are consistent with the notion that once having
completed an acquisition, the acquirer faces a moral hazard with respect
to the degree of effort it places behind helping the seller achieve targets
123. 986 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Del. Ch. 2009).
124. 984 A.2d 126, 132 (Del. Ch. 2009).
125. I conducted two searches in an attempt to uncover the underlying rate of disputes with
respect to contingent earnout provisions. First, I conducted a search of both the Westlaw and
Bloomberg Law databases for court opinions in the Federal courts and Delaware courts related disputes
over earnouts, milestone payments, or other contingent payments. This search revealed very few
opinions. Over the period 2009–2010, Delaware generated only three court opinions. The Federal
courts, for their part, generated just eighteen earnout-related opinions over the same period. To the
extent courts issued written opinions, five of the twenty-one earnout-related opinions involved attempts
by plaintiffs to avoid contractually-mandated arbitration to resolve disputes over earnout payments. In
those cases, the courts uniformly denied them access to the court and ordered the parties back to
arbitration. The balance of the cases related to claims by sellers that acquirers were unfairly
withholding earnout payments due to them. In those claims, former shareholders of the seller generally
make allegations that the acquirer took actions to frustrate the ability of the seller to achieve the earnout
targets (i.e. acquirer moral hazard). A similar review of the SEC filings and Delaware and Federal court
dockets with respect to transactions in the study sample during the study period turns up only one
disclosure of earnout-related litigation with similar allegations against the acquirer. Complaint, TRS
Inst., LLC v. Transcend Servs., No. 10-362 (M.D.N.C. May 6, 2010).
126. TRS Inst., LLC v. Transcend Servs., No. 10-362 (M.D.N.C. May 6, 2010). Coates finds that
private arbitration provisions are common in transactions involving private company sellers and priceadjustment clauses. John C. Coates IV, Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from M&A
(Feb. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915135. Goldberg
notes that his personal experience suggests that earnout related disputes are under-represented in the
formal legal system. See Goldberg supra note 122.
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pursuant to the earnout provision.127
To the extent acquirer moral hazard is a problem, this could lead to
what appears to outside observers to be a pooling equilibrium. Sellers
may nevertheless attempt to signal their high quality, but such signaling
is systematically undermined during the post-closing period by acquirers
with incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior with respect to the
seller. Although the signal is overwhelmed by the confounding effect of
acquirer moral hazard and thus unobservable to outside observers, it still
may be possible that acquirers interpret the seller’s offering to accept an
earnout as a costly ex ante signal. If, however, the confounding effects
of acquirer moral hazard are sufficiently large, one might also expect to
observe sellers avoiding the earnout mechanism altogether. The fact
that sellers nevertheless agree to earnout provisions suggests that either
that acquirer moral hazard is not a significant concern or that
uncertainty, rather than information asymmetries, are more central to
seller motivations in accepting earnout provisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study calls into question the conventional academic wisdom with
respect to the role played by earnouts in corporate acquisitions.
Previous empirical works claim that earnouts are prevalent in
circumstances where information asymmetries are severe. In such
situations, earnouts are thought to play a role in signaling hidden
information to potential acquirers. However, recently available fair
value accounting data suggests that earnouts do not permit high quality
sellers to sort themselves out from low quality sellers. If sellers are not
able to rely on earnouts to signal private information about their hidden
value to prospective buyers, then earnouts lose one of the most
important functions attributed to them by earlier studies and are thus not

127. According to the complaint in TRS Institute v. Transcend Services, immediately upon closing
the transaction, the acquirer was alleged to have engaged in strategic behavior intended to reduce the
likelihood that the acquirer would be required to make payment on the earnout. The Complaint states:
Based on the performance of TRS and their conversations with Transcend’s
management, TRS executives believed TRS revenues would exceed the milestones
necessary to generate the maximum Earn-Out of $3,000,000. Beginning almost
immediately after closing, however, Transcend engaged in a series of actions deliberately
designed to minimize the amount of the Earn-Out while maximizing Transcend’s
revenues. These actions—including the allocation of resources away from TRS
customer accounts, delays in implementation of new TRS accounts, and discouraging the
development of TRS’s relationship with its most valuable customer and referral source—
breached the express terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement between TRS and
Transcend and violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all
contracts.
Complaint, TRS Inst., LLC v. Transcend Servs., No. 10-362 (M.D.N.C. May 6, 2010).
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as useful as expected in overcoming the problem of adverse selection.
Instead of signaling, earnouts appear to resolve the question of precontractual uncertainty. In resolving uncertainty rather than adverse
selection, earnouts may facilitate the parties in reaching agreement on
pricing without necessarily engaging in any information signaling.
These results should urge modesty on scholars of transactional law who
posit that buyers and sellers rely on earnouts to resolve problems of
asymmetric information in the deal setting.
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